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HUSBAND-WIFE TESTIMONY
litical propaganda in the United States is increasing. The Foreign Rela-
tions Committee staff, which recently prepared a study on the nondiplo-
matic activities of representatives of foreign governments," concluded
that the labeling provisions, meant to counter the effect of foreign politi-
cal propaganda, "have been all but erased from the lawbooks through
nonapplication."88
DAviD L. SIMIELE
Husband-Wife Testimony in Ohio
Husband-wife testimony in Ohio is regulated by statute in both civil
and criminal cases.' The Ohio civil statute has incorporated the com-
mon-law rule concerning confidential communications. The Ohio crimi-
nal statute has incorporated, to some extent, the common-law rules con-
cerning the incapacity of one spouse to testify on behalf of the other and
the spouses' privilege of not having to testify against each other. Much
confusion exists, however, as to the interpretation and application of these
statutory provisions.
COMMON-LAW FOUNDATIONS
At the common-law neither party to a marriage was competent to
testify as to any confidential communication made between them, nor
could either be a witness in favor of or against the other.2 The rationale
for these rules was originally based upon the legal fiction that the hus-
band and wife were one. Since a party to an action was disqualified
from testifying because of interest, the spouse was likewise held to be
barred.' However, the interest disqualification was soon abolished and
the courts presented other reasons for perpetuating the rules.4
Confidential Communications
The common-law rule regarding confidential communications be-
tween husband and wife concerned the competency of the witness and
was not a rule based upon substantive evidence or privilege.5 The rea-
son for this was that it was originally a mere extension of the rule that
neither spouse could be permitted to testify for or against the other.'
However, it soon became a separate rule justified on its own grounds.
The most commonly cited of these grounds is the necessity to protect the
marriage institution.7 This reasoning has been criticized on the basis that
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
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few people, if any, know and rely on the protection of this rule in mak-
ing communications to their spouse,8 and that the rule is an "indefensible
obstruction to truth in practice."9
The common-law rule that made spouses incompetent to testify as to
confidential communications by one to the other should not be confused
with either the separate and distinct privilege of not having to testify
against one's spouse or the rule disqualifying one spouse from testifying
on behalf of the other,'" The latter two rules rest upon grounds com-
pletely independent of those supporting the exclusion of testimony by
the spouses concerning confidential communications made by one to the
other during coverture.
Testifying on Behalf of One's Spouse
Although the disqualification from testifying for one's spouse came
into being about the same time as the privilege of not having to testify
against the other spouse, the two concepts have no necessary connection
in principle or purpose." The disqualification of the spouses to come
forward voluntarily in favor of each other seems to rest, first, on the
ground that there is a natural bias of affection. Secondly, if such testi-
mony were permitted, the spouse would be subject to cross examination
which might divulge information unfavorable to the accused spouse.
Therefore, the very purpose for which the privilege was intended would
be defeated.' 2 The latter reasoning has been criticized on the basis that
1. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2317.02, 2945.42.
2. People v. Hayes, 140 N.Y. 484, 35 N.E. 951 (1894); Lock v. State, 33 Ohio App. 445,
169 N.E. 833 (1929); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 835 (1949); Annot., 63 A.L.R. 107 (1929).
3. Quick, Privilege Under Uniform Rules of Evidence, 26 U. CINC. L. REV. 537, 550
(1957); Note, Evidence, 6 OHIo ST. L.J. 78 (1939).
4. Damn v. Lodge, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952); Sessions v. Trevitt, 39 Ohio
St. 259 (1883); Quick, supra note 3, at 550. See also Bird v. Hueston, 10 Ohio St. 418
(1859), where the court stated in its syllabus: "2. The rule that husband and wife are in-
competent to testify for or against each other, is not changed by the removal of incompetency
on the ground of interest. Whether the husband or wife be a party to the action, or only
interested in the event, the policy of the rule applies."
5. Annot., 4 A.LR.2d 835, 836 (1949).
6. Ibid.
7. Marsh v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 89 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir. 1937); Sessions v. Trevitt,
39 Ohio St. 259, 267 (1883); Cook v. Grange, 18 Ohio 526 (1849); Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d
1389, 1391 (1950); Annot., 63 A.L.R. 107 (1929). See also Dick v. Hyer, 94 Ohio St.
351, 360, 114 N.E. 251, 253 (1916); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion:
Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REV. 100, 113 (1956).
8. Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence; Family Relations, 13
MINN. L. REV. 675 (1929).
9. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 5 2228, at 221 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
10. Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 835, 836 (1949); Annot., 63 A.L.R. 107 (1929). Cf. Quick, supra
note 3, at 552. The UNIFoRM RULES OF EVIDENCE abolish the for and against rules.
11. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2227, at 211 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
12. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 601, at 732-33 (2d ed. 1940).
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it will be the accused spouse himself who will call, the other spouse to
testify in his favor."3 The law should not deny to the accused spouse the
Tight to the testimony of the other spouse because of a risk which he him-
self is willing to accept.' 4
Testifying Against One's Spouse
The privilege of not having to testify against one's spouse rests upon
grounds completely different from those supporting the disqualification
from voluntarily testifying in the other's behalf.15 The basis for the
authorities supporting this rule seems to be that there is a natural repug-
nance to compel a husband or wife to be the possible means of the other's
downfall.' Even this reasoning has been criticized on the basis that it is
a mere legal anachronism and an obstruction to truth.'
Exceptions to the Privilege
Certain exceptions to the privilege of not having to testify against
one's spouse were recognized at the common law on the basis of necessity,
that is, a necessity to avoid the extreme injustices which might inure
upon a strict enforcement of the rule." In Ohio, as in other states, these
common-law exceptions have taken statutory form.' Ohio Revised Code
section 2945.42 permits one spouse to testify against the other in all
actions and proceedings regarding personal injury of either by the other,
bigamy, failure to provide for, neglect of, or cruelty to their children un-
der sixteen years of age,"0 and in proceedings under the Ohio Revised Code
sections 3113.01 or 3113.03 for neglect or abandonment of the wife.2 '
Further exceptions seem to exist in Ohio, although not by statute,
where the privilege is being used to perpetrate a fraud,2 where the spouse
is acting as the agent for the other spouse,2" and where the spouse is testi-
13. Haberty v. State, 8 Ohio C.C.R. 262 (Cir. Ct. App. 1894).
14. 2 WiGMORB, EvIDENcE, op. cit. supra note 12, at 732-33.
15. 8 WIGMORE, EvDENcE § 2228, at 216 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
16. Id. at 217; Note, .vidence, 6 OHiO ST. UJ. 78, 81 (1939).
17. 8 WIGMOit, EvIDENcE, op. cit, supra note 15, at 221.
18. Whipp v. State, 34 Ohio St. 87, 88 (1877); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2239, at 242
(McNaughton rev. 1961); Quick, supra note 3, at 551.
19. OMo REV. CODE §§ 2945A2, 3105.11.
20. State v. Ward, 92 Ohio App. 179, 109 N.E.2d 488 (1952).
21. Chapter 3115 of the Ohio Revised Code provides a means for enforcing the right of a
wife, or any other person entided to support, to be supported by her husband when he has
left the jurisdiction. See 28 OHIO Jui. 2d Husband and Wife 5 47, at 162 (1958).
22. OHIO JUtR. Witnesses § 253, at 256 (1936); 28 R.C.L. § 115, at 526.
23. 2 WGMORB, EVD ENCE § 616, at 749 (3d ed. 1940); 42 OHO JuI., op. cit. supra note
22, at 256; 28 R.C.L. § 116, at 527. If this were not the case a spouse would be able to in-
sulate himself from liability by always making his spouse his agent for business purposes.
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fying in an action against his spouse and a co-defendant and his testimony
is directed toward the co-defendant.24
Common-Law Distinctions as Incorporated
in Ohio Statutory Law
Many elements of the common-law rules regarding husband-wife
testimony have been incorporated in the statutes of various jurisdictions.
This is true in Ohio where the applicable statute in civil cases is Ohio
Revised Code section 2317.022" and the applicable statute in criminal
cases is Ohio Revised Code section 2945.42.28
The Ohio civil statute preserves the common-law incompetency of
the spouses to testify as to confidential communications made by one to
the other. The Ohio criminal statute, however, while partially preserv-
ing the common-law privilege of a spouse not having to testify against
the other spouse, completely changes the common-law rule disqualifying
one spouse from testifying on behalf of the other spouse. Thus, contrary
to the common-law rule prohibiting one spouse from testifying on behalf
of the other spouse, the Ohio criminal statute permits a spouse to testify
on behalf of the other spouse in "all criminal prosecutions."
TESTIMONY IN CIVIL CASES - OHIO REVISED CODE § 2317.02
In Ohio the rule as to husband-wife testimony in civil cases relates to
the competency of the spouses to testify in regard to confidential com-
24. Edwards v. Edwards, 24 Ohio St. 402 (1873) (separate judgments only).
25. OHIo REV. CODE § 2317.02 provides as follows:
"The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:
"(C)Husband or wife, concerning any communication made by one to the other, or an
act done by either in the presence of the other, during coverture, unless the communication
was made, or act done, in the known presence or hearing of a third person competent to be a
witness; and such rule is the same if the marital relation has ceased to exist."
26. OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.42 provides as follows:
"No person is disqualified as a witness in a criminal prosecution by reason of his interest
in the event thereof as a party or otherwise, or by reason of his conviction of crime. Husband
and wife are competent witnesses to testify in behalf of each other in all criminal prosecutions,
and to testify against each other in all actions, prosecutions, and proceedings for personal in-
jury of either by the other, bigamy, or failure to provide for, neglect of, or cruelty to their
children under 16 years of age. A wife may testify against her husband in a prosecution
under section 3113.01 or 3113.03 of the Revised Code for neglect or abandonment of such
wife. Such interest, conviction, or relationship may be shown for the purpose of affecting
the creditability of such witness. Husband or wife shall not testify concerning a communica-
tion made by one to the other, or act done by either in the presence of the other, during
coverture, unless the communication was made or act done in the known presence or hearing
of a third person competent to be a witness, or in case of personal injury by either the hus-
band or wife to the other, or bigamy, or failure to provide for, or neglect or cruelty of either
to their children under 16 years of age, or neglect or abandonment of such wife under such
sections. The presence or whereabouts of the husband or wife is not an act under this section.
The rule is the same if the marital relation has ceased to exist." (Emphasis added.) See also
OHIo REv. CODE 55 2905.22, 2917A4.
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munications made or acts done by the husband or wife to the other during
coverture,27 and does not affect their competency to testify as to other
matters.
Necessity of the Marriage Relationship
The Ohio rule regarding husband-wife testimony in civil cases applies
only to those individuals who maintain, in relation to one another, the
legal relation of husband and wife.28 Ohio courts have held that the
burden of proving this relationship rests upon the party opposing the
competency of the testimony2 9
Since, under the Ohio statute, the rule attaches only to communica-
tions made or acts done by one spouse to the other during the marriage
relationship, it follows that the rule cannot be recognized in regard to
second bigamous or plural spouses,3" or those who have procured their
marriages through fraud."1 Moreover, acts or communications made be-
tween husband and wife before marriage ore not subject to the rule, as
they were not made, during coverture.3"
The Ohio civil statute, by itself and as incorporated in the criminal
statute,83 remains in effect after the marital relation has ceased to exist.
Therefore, communications made by one spouse to the other cannot be
testified to by a spouse after the marriage has been dissolved by divorce'
or death. 5
Since the underlying reason for retaining the rule in respect to confi-
dential communications is to protect the marriage institution, the basis
for it would seem to fall upon the dissolution of the marriage. This has
been taken into consideration in the drafting of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, which provide that the rule is deemed to be at an end upon
divorce or the death of either spouse."
Effect of Presence of Third Person
Where a communication is made or act done by one spouse to the
other in the known presence or hearing of a third person, the communi-
27. Omo REV. CODE § 2317.02.
28. Stober v. McCarter, 4 Ohio St. 513 (1855); Lynch v. State, 5 Ohio App. 16 (1915);
42 Omno JuR. Witnesses § 241, at 245 (1936).
29. Lynch v. State, supra note 28, at 26.
30. Ibid; 8 WIGMoBE, EvDENcE § 2231, at 224 (3d ed. 1961); 42 OMO JR., op. cit.
supra note 28, at 245.
31. 42 OHIO Jim., op. cit. supra note 26, at 245; 28 R.C.L. § 114, at 526.
32. Bolen v. Humes, 94 Ohio App. 1, 114 N.E.2d 281 (1951).
33. OHIo REv. CODE §§ 2317.02, 2945.42.
34. Cook v. Grange, 18 Ohio 526 (1849); Community Traction Co. v. Neorr, 52 Ohio
App. 190, 3 N.E.2d 638 (1936); Holmes v. Pere Marquette Rd. Co., 28 Ohio App. 297, 162
N.E. 675 (1927); Losh v. Brunk, 18 Ohio App. 412 (1924); Dischner v. Dischner, 116 Ohio
App. 86 (1921).
35. Stober v. McCarter, 4 Ohio St. 513 (1855).
36. Quick, supra note 3, at 553.
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cation is no longer held to be confidential in nature and, therefore, is no
longer entitled to the protection of the rule."
Known Presence of Third Person
Some trouble has been encountered in various jurisdictions as to the
effect of a third person's presence if it was not known to the spouse mak-
ing the communication. Logically it would seem that before a communi-
cation or act can be deemed to be non-confidential in nature, the presence
of the third person should have been known to the communicating spouse.
However, the majority of jurisdictions seem only to require that the com-
munication be made within the hearing of a third person, whether known
or not, in order to be rendered admissible.88
Fortunately the above problem does not exist in Ohio for the appli-
cable statute, Ohio Revised Code section 2317.02, specifically provides
that before a communication or act is deemed to be non-confidential in
nature it must be made in the known presence or hearing of a third per-
son." One should note that when a confidential communication is over-
heard, whether accidentally or by design, by some person who is neither
a member of the husband-wife relation nor a necessary intermediary, such
third person may testify as to the communication, being absolutely unaf-
fected by the rule.4"
Competency of Third Person
Even though the act was done or communication made in the known
presence or hearing of a third person, the act or communication is still
deemed inadmissible if such third person, at the time the act was done
or communication made, was incompetent to be a witness.4 Thus, the
rule can still be claimed if the third person present at the time the
act was done or communication made was of unsound mind, a child un-
der ten years of age who was incapable of receiving just impressions of
facts and transactions and relating them truly,4" or an attorney or
physician of the spouses during an interview or consultation.43 Further-
37. Sessions v. Trevitt, 39 Ohio St. 259, 267-68 (1883); Bean v. Green, 33 Ohio St. 444,
447 (1878); Annot., 63 A.L.R. 107, 108 (1929).
38. Linnell v. Linnell, 249 Mass. 51, 143 N.E. 813 (1924); Annot., 63 A.L.R. 107, 114-15
(1929).
39. OHIO REv. CODE §§ 2317.02, 2945.42.
40. 42 OHIO JUR. Witnesses § 237, at 241 (1936); 28 R.C.L. § 110, at 521.
41. OHIO REv. CODE 5§ 2317.02, 2945.42; 42 OHIO JUa. Witnesses § 248, at 252 (1936).
42. OHIO REv. CODE § 2317.01.
43. Sieving v. Seidelmeyer, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 609 (Super. Ct. 1879); 42 OHIO JUR.,
supra note 41, at 252. See also Alliance First Nat'l Bank v. Maus, 100 Ohio App. 433, 137
N.E.2d 305 (1955), where the court stated in its syllabus:
"I. Under the provisions of Sections 2317.02 and 2317.03, Revised Code, an attorney
who represents both a husband and wife in a transaction may testify concerning such transac-
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more, testimony concerning husband-wife communications would be ad-
missible even if the third person, known to be present and competent at
the time the communication was made or act done, is not living at the
time of trial4" or is otherwise incompetent at the time of trial.
Determination of Presence or Competency
Upon objection to the introduction of alleged confidential communi-
cations, the examining party will have the burden of proving that a third
person competent to be a witness was present at the time the communica-
tion was made or act done and that the third person's presence was known
to the spouse. 5
The determination of whether a third person, competent to be a wit-
ness, was present at the time the communication was made or act done
is for the court to decide and not for the jury. 6 Further, a husband or
wife called to testify in regard to such communication or act is competent
to testify as to the known presence, hearing, or knowledge of such third
personY
Acts and Communications Under the Ohio Civil Statute
For an act or communication made between the spouses to be gov-
erned by the civil statute, it must have been confidential in nature and
must have arisen from the marital relation. Also, the civil statute regard-
ing husband-wife confidential communications prohibits only testimony
as to the substance of the matter communicated and not the fact that a
communication was made by one spouse to the other without relating
what was communicated.48
Knowledge Gained Through General Observation
Although a spouse is incompetent to testify to any matter the knowl-
edge of which was acquired in conjugal confidence, he or she may testify
to any other matter concerning his or her spouse, insofar as such knowl-
tions, where, after the decease of one of the parties thereto, the surviving spouse gives his
consent."
44. Sessions v. Trevitt, 39 Ohio St. 259 (1883); Sieving v. Seidelmeyer, 7 Ohio Dec. Re-
print 609 (Super. Ct. 1879); Morgan v. Bartlette, 3 Ohio C.C.R. 431 (Cir. Ct. 1888);
Citizens Bank v. Andrews, 24 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 361, 381 (C.P. 1923).
45. Losh v. Brunk, 18 Ohio App. 412, 418 (1924).
46. Finnegan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 162 N.].2d 216 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958); Corn-
mercial Gazette Co. v. Grooms, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 489 (Super. Ct. 1889).
47. McCague v. Miller, 36 Ohio St. 595 (1891).
48. Annot., 10 A.LR.2d 1389, 1396 (1950).
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edge is gained from general observation not springing from the marital
relation.49
In Stober v. McCarter" the Ohio Supreme Court permitted a dece-
dent's widow to testify as to work and labor performed by the plaintiff
for her husband before his death. In admitting this testimony over the
objections of the deceased spouse's administrator, the court held that this
was an "independent fact" learned during coverture. Since this was an
"independent fact," open to the observation of everyone, the disclosure
of it by the deceased's spouse would violate no conjugal confidence.5
Along these same lines Ohio courts have held that a wife could testify
as to the whereabouts of her husband a few days before his death,5" and
that a wife could testify as to her observation of the accident scene and
conversation with her husband as he lay dying as the result of a house-
hold accident.5"
The latter case involved an action based upon an accident and life
insurance policy for accidental death. The defendant insurance company
objected to the introduction of testimony by the decedent's widow as to
what her husband had related to her concerning the cause of his injury and
as to her observation of the accident scene. In holding the widow's testi-
mony admissible, the court stated that the Ohio legislature could not have
intended the exclusion of all transactions and communications made be-
tween husband and wife, however unsecretive or unconfidential in
nature.
54
Conversely, in Community Traction Co. v. Neorr55 the Ohio Supreme
Court held that a divorced woman was incompetent to testify as to the
odor of beer upon her former husband's breath immediately after an auto-
mobile accident that had occurred while they were still married. In Com-
mercial Gazette Co. v. Grooms5" the court went so far as to prohibit a
husband from testifying as to unconscious acts done and words spoken
by his wife while she was in a somnambulistic state.
In view of the policy reasons for retaining the husband-wife rule con-
49. Marsh v. Preferred Life Ins. Co., 89 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir. 1937); Stober v. McCarter,
4 Ohio St. 513, 523-24 (1855); Finnegan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 162 N.E.2d 216
(Ohio Ct. App. 1958); 42 OHIo JuR. Witnesses §§ 246, 251, at 249, 254 (1936); Annot.,
10 A.L.R.2d 1389, 1391 (1950).
50. 4 Ohio St. 513 (1855).
51. Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23, 26 (1884); Stober v. McCarter, 4 Ohio St. 513, 523-24
(1855); Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1389, 1418 (1950).
52. Finnegan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 162 N.E.2d 216 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
53. Marsh v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 89 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1937).
54. Id. at 934.
55. 52 Ohio St. 190, 3 N.E.2d 638 (1936). See also Stevenson v. Morris, 37 Ohio St.
10 (1881), where the court prohibited a wife's testimony regarding instructions given to her
by her husband on how she should protect herself in case she was assaulted.
56. 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 489 (Super. Ct. 1889).
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cerning confidential communications, the decisions of the courts in the
Neorr and Grooms cases seem indefensible. The communications made
and acts done were not based upon any marital confidence and, thus, the
application of the rule merely aided in the obstruction of truth and justice.
Written Communications
Generally, the rules pertaining to written communications are no dif-
ferent than those relating to oral communications;5" that is, a com-
munication made between the spouses should not be admissible unless it
appears that the communication was made under such circumstances so that
it cannot be considered confidential. " Accordingly, in many jurisdictions,
including Ohio, the courts have held that where a written communication
comes into the possession of a third person, such communication is ad-
missible against the spouse when produced at trial.5" In Ohio this rule
seems to be the same regardless of the fact that the third person acd-
dentally or wrongfully came into possession of the communication."0
Statutory Effect on Competency of Spouses to Testify as to
Confidential Communications
The general rule in most jurisdictions is that the exclusion of testi-
mony pertaining to confidential communications is not an absolute pro-
hibition."' In Ohio many courts have treated the words of the statute,
"shall not testify in certain respects," as being mandatory words of dis-
qualification and have, therefore, held that the spouses are absolutely
prohibited from testifying as to confidential communications except as
specifically provided for by the statute.62 However, in 1924, the Ohio
Supreme Court in Ruch v. State3 permitted a spouse to testify in regard
to a confidential communication due to the fact that counsel made no
objection. The court in its opinion rejected the theory that a spouse is
wholly prohibited from testifying as to confidential communications.
57. Annot., 63 A.L.R. 107, 120 (1929).
58. Marsh v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 89 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir. 1937); Finnegan v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 162 NYE.2d 216 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958); 42 OHIO JUR. Witnesses S
246, 249, at 249, 254 (1936); Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1389, 1391 (1950).
59. Whalen v. State, 12 Ohio C.C.R. 584 (Cir. Ct. 1896); Lowther v. State, 4 Ohio C.C.R.
522 (Cir. Ct. 1890); Annot., 63 A.L.IL 107, 120 (1929).
60. Whalen v. State, supra note 59; 42 OMo JUR. Witnesses §§ 240, 250 at 244, 253
(1936); Annot., 63 A.L.R. 107, 120 (1929).
61. Note, Privileged Communications - Who Alay Assert and Who May Waive the Privi-
lege Under the Ohio Statute, 20 U. CINC. L. REV. 75 (1951); Note, Evidence, 6 OHIo ST.
L.U. 78, 81 (1939).
62. Note, 20 U. CINc. L. REV. 75, supra note 61, at 78.
63. 111 Ohio St. 580, 146 NE. 67 (1924). See also Locke v. State, 33 Ohio App. 445,
169 NY- 833 (1929).
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The right to object to the introduction of testimony concerning con-
fidential communications made by one spouse to the other may be waived
by the person entitled to assert the rule."4 Further, if the rule is once
waived it cannot again be asserted in the same trial. Some authorities do
state, however, that the waiver of the rule at one trial will not preclude
the assertion of it at a subsequent trial.65
Persons Who May Claim the Benefits of the Rule
Generally, the rule in most jurisdictions is that the husband-wife
rule concerning confidential communications may be claimed only by the
communicating spouse.66 Nevertheless, Ohio courts are in hopeless con-
flict as to who qualifies under the statute as the one entitled to its benefits.67
In Dick v. Hyer 8 an action on a promissory note was instituted
against the defendant, a co-maker with her former husband. The de-
fendant, in attempting to establish that the date on the note was altered
after she had signed it, testified that she had signed the note at her
husband's request and in his presence only. The plaintiff objected to the
introduction of this testimony on the ground that it was protected by
the Ohio statute as a confidential communication. The court sustained
the plaintiff's objection to the wife's testimony and, thus, allowed one
not a party to the marital relation to claim the benefit of the statute.
On the basis of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in the Dick case
and other Ohio court decisions in this same area, the trend of judicial
authority apparently permits the benefit of the rule concerning confi-
dential communications to be claimed not only by the parties to the mar-
riage but even by other parties involved in the action." The inequities
that can and do result when a stranger to the rule is permitted to claim
its protection are immediately apparent as evidenced by the Dick case.
A clarification of this point is long overdue, if not from the courts
themselves, then through legislative action.
64. Ruch v. State, 111 Ohio St. 580, 146 N.E. 67 (1924); Pendleton v. Pendleton, 103
Ohio App. 345, 145 N.E.2d 485 (1957); Piqua v. Collett, 151 N.E.2d 770 (Ohio Ct. App.
1956); 42 OHIO JUR. Witnesses § 237, at 240, 241 (1936).
65. Pendleton v. Pendleton, supra note 64; 42 OHIO JUR., supra note 64, at 240-41; 28
R.C.L. § 110, at 521.
66. Note, Privileged Communications -i Who May Assert and Who May Waive the Privi-
lege Under the Ohio Statute, 20 U. CINc. L. REV. 75, 80 (1951).
67. Note, Husband-Wife Privileged Communications Summarized, 8 CLEV. MAR. L. REV.
531 (1959).
68. 94 Ohio St. 351, 114 N.E. 251 (1916).
69. Dick v. Hyer, 94 Ohio St. 351, 114 N.E. 251 (1916); Community Traction Co. v.
Neorr, 52 Ohio App. 190, 3 N.E.2d 638 (1936); Worland v. McGill, 26 Ohio App. 442
(1927); Note, 20 U. CINc. L. REV. 75, supra note 66, at 77.
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Objecion to Admission of Confidential Communications
Objection to the admissibility of confidential communications must
be made at the time the testimony is sought to be introduced and not
for the first time on appeal.7" However, where the objection is properly
made at the trial level, there is a presumption, on appeal, in favor of the
admissibility of the testimony."1 It will not be considered error for the
lower court to have admitted such testimony unless this presumption can
be rebutted by the record.
Actions in Which Testimony Concerning Confidential
Communications May Be Admitted
There are certain actions at law in which no objection can be made
to the introduction of testimony concerning confidential communications.
Although these actions are not listed in the Ohio civil statute'2 they are
enumerated in the Ohio criminal statute73 and in an Ohio divorce statute.7"
Criminal Actions
Under the Ohio criminal statute objection may not be made to the
introduction of testimony concerning confidential communications in
cases of:
[P] ersonal injury by either the husband or wife to the other, or bigamy,
or failure to provide for, or neglect or cruelty of either to their children
under 16 years of age, or neglect or abandonment of such wife under
such sections.75
Divorce and Alimony Actions
The protection of the husband-wife confidential communication rule
cannot be claimed in divorce and alimony actions. The applicable stat-
ute, Ohio Revised Code section 3105.11, provides:
The parties notwithstanding their marital relation, shall be competent
to testify in actions and proceedings under section 3105.01 to 3105.21
inclusive, of the Revised Code, to the same extent that any other witness
might 76
70. Gaydas v. Fusselman, 11 Ohio L. Abs. 652 (Ct. App. 1931).
71. Westerman v. Westerman, 25 Ohio St. 500 (1874); F. A. Requarth Co. v. Holland, 78
Ohio App. 493, 66 NXE.2d 329 (1946); cases cited note 46 supra.
72. Omo REv. CODE § 2317.02.
73. Omo Ruv. CODE 5 2945A2.
74. OHIO REV. CODE § 3105.11.
75. OHIo REv. CODE 5 2945.42.
76. OHIo REv. CODE 5 3105.11. See also Weikert v. Weikert, 143 N.E.2d 863 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1956).
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In McEntire v. McEntire' a husband and wife entered into an oral agree-
ment of separation and property settlement and then parted. The wife
attempted to exclude the husband's testimony concerning the oral separation
agreement on the ground that it was a confidential communication made
during coverture. The court, in holding the husband's testimony ad-
missible, pointed out that under Ohio statutory law a spouse is permitted
to testify against his mate in divorce and alimony proceedings "to the
same extent that any other witness might."t8
Grand Jury Hearings
The exclusion of a spouse's testimony concerning confidential communi-
cations does not apply in hearings before the grand jury. In Wickline v.
Alvist" a wife appeared before the grand jury and testified against her
husband in regard to confidential communications made between them.
The husband claimed that the indictment returned against him and all
subsequent proceedings based upon this indictment were void because
of the inadmissibility of his wife's testimony. The court, in holding the
grand jury's indictment valid, did not feel that the grand jury should be
bound by technical rules of evidence and further stated:
1. The grand jury, in inquiring into crimes and offenses and return-
ing indictments, does not exercise a judicial function.
2. An indictment and subsequent proceedings based thereon are not
rendered invalid on the ground that illegal and incompetent testimony
was heard by the grand jury which voted such indictment.80
Alienation of Affection Suits
The Ohio courts seem to be in agreement that in actions involving
alienation of affection a confidential communication made between hus-
band and wife is not subject to exclusion under the statute ff the purpose
of introducing such testimony is to show the state of feeling that existed
between the spouses prior to the alleged alienation of affection.8' This
rule is the same whether the confidential communication was made
prior or subsequent to the marriage relationship. 2
77. 107 Ohio St. 510, 140 N.E. 328 (1923); 42 OHIo JuR. Witnesses § 242, at 246
(1936).
78. McEntire v. McEntire, 107 Ohio St. 510, 521, 140 N.E. 328, 331 (1923).
79. 103 Ohio App. 1, 144 N.E.2d 207 (1957).
80. Ibid.
81. Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23 (1884); Whalen v. State, 12 Ohio C.C.R. 584 (Cir. Ct.
1893); 28 OHIo JuR. 2d Husband and Wife § 156, at 280 (1958); 21 OHIo Jur. Husband
and Wife § 286, at 570 (1932); Annot., 36 A.L.R. 1068 (1925). In Brodbeck v. Ottgen,
17 Ohio Supp. 129 (C.P. 1945), the court held that admissions in a husband's answer and
cross-petition filed in his wife's divorce action were admissible as evidence to show the status
of conjugal relations at the time of the divorce suit.
82. Preston v. Bowers, 13 Ohio St. 1 (1861).
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RULES IN CRIMINAL CASES -
OHIO REVISED CODE § 2945.42
In Ohio the common-law rules relating to the testimony of a husband
or wife in a criminal case have been somewhat changed by Ohio Re-
vised Code section 2945.42.
Confidential Communications
The Ohio criminal statute regulating husband-wife testimony in-
corporates the common-law rule as adopted by the Ohio civil statute
that:
[H]usband or wife, [shall not testify] concerning any communica-
tion made by one to the other, or an act done by either in the presence
of the other, during coverture, unless the communication was made, or
act done, in the known presence or hearing of a third person competent
to be a witness ... 83
The rule pertaining to confidential communications in criminal cases,
as in civil cases, applies only to those individuals who maintain the legal
relation of husband and wife, and the rule remains in effect even after the
marital relation has ceased to exist.
Acts and Communications Under the Criminal Statute
The terms "act" and "communication" as employed in the criminal
statute are construed in the same manner as in connection with the civil
statute. One exception does exist, however, in that the criminal statute
specifically provides that a spouse may testify as to the presence or where-
abouts of the other spouse even though no third person was present at the
time.84
Spouse's Waiver of the Rule
The trend of authority in recent Ohio cases has been to construe the
criminal rule as to husband-wife confidential communications in the same
manner as the civil statute and to make the spouses competent to waive
the rule.8" In Ruch v. State" the Ohio Supreme Court stated:
Where in a prosecution for crime, the wife of the defendant is called
by the state to testify, and gives testimony material to the indictment,
which testimony consists in part of a communication made by the hus-
band to the wife during coverture, not in the known presence or
83. OHIo Rnv. CODE 5 2945.42.
84. ibid.; 42 OHio JuR. Witnesses S 256, at 259 (1936). "The presence or whereabouts
of the husband or wife is not an act under this section." Omo REv. CODE S 2945A2.
85. Ruch v. State, 111 Ohio St. 580, 146 N.E. 67 (1924); Piqua v. Collett, 151 N.E.2d 770
(Ohio C. App. 1956).
86. 111 Ohio St. 580, 146 N.E. 67 (1924).
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hearing of a third person competent to be a witness, and no objection
is made by the defendant or his counsel thereto, and no motion to ex-
dude the testimony, and no request to instruct the jury not to consider
such testimony, and the attention of the trial court is not called thereto
at any time during the trial, the defendant will be held to have waived
the provisions of section 13659 General Code [Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.-
42], in his behalf, and such circumstances will not constitute reversible
error. (Emphasis added.)87
Testifying on Behalf of One's Spouse
Under the provisions of the Ohio criminal statute the common-law
disqualification of a spouse to testify on behalf of the other spouse has
been completely abrogated. A spouse is now competent to testify on
behalf of the other spouse in "all criminal prosecutions." 8
Testifying Against One's Spouse
The common-law privilege of not having to testify against one's
spouse has been partially abrogated by the criminal statute. " Under
the provisions of Ohio Revised Code section 2945.42 one spouse is now
competent to testify against the other in:
all actions, prosecutions, and proceedings for personal injury of either
by the other, bigamy, or failure to provide for, neglect of, or cruelty
to their children under 16 years of age. A wife may testify against her
husband in a prosecution under section 3113.01. or 3113.03 of the
Revised Code for neglect or abandonment of such wife.90
Waiver of the Privilege
Prior to the first statutory enactment in Ohio in regard to husband-
wife testimony in criminal cases the courts followed the rule of the gen-
eral incompetency of the spouse to testify,9 ' an incompetency that could
not be waived." However, recent Ohio cases have construed the criminal
statute so as to render the spouse partially competent to testify and, there-
fore, able to waive the incompetency of a spouse called to the stand by
the state."3
87. Id. at 580, 146 N.E. at 67.
88. OHIo REv. CODE § 2945.42. See 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 601, at 731 (3d ed. 1940);
Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 835, 836 (1949). Under the UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE the for
and against rules have been abolished.
89. State v. Rodriguez, 110 Ohio App. 307, 169 N.E.2d 444 (1959).
90. OHIo REV. CODE § 2945.42.
91. Steen v. State, 20 Ohio St. 333 (1870); State v. Rodriguez, 110 Ohio App. 307, 169
N.E.2d 444 (1959); Locke v. State, 33 Ohio App. 445, 448, 169 N.E. 833, 835 (1929);
Note, Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. L.J. 78, 81 (1939).
92. Schultz v. State, 32 Ohio St. 276 (1877); Steen v. State, supra note 91; Locke v. State,
smpra note 91; Note, supra note 91, at 82.
93. Ruch v. State, 111 Ohio St. 580, 146 N.E. 67 (1924); Piqua v. Collett, 151 N.E.2d 770
(Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
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In Locke v. State94 the Ohio Supreme Court sustained the accused's ob-
jection to the testimony of his spouse after she was called to the stand by
the state and examined by the prosecution at length. Although the court,
in this case, did not hold that the accused spouse waived the privilege of
the statute, it did state:
The spouse is no longer absolutely incompetent. Husband or wife
may testify for each other, and this partial competency makes it possible
for the accused to waive the competency of such witness when called by
the state. (Emphasis added.) 95
From the viewpoint of policy, every consideration supports the theory
that the privilege not to testify against one's spouse may be waived. 6
Owing to the scarcity of modern case law on the subject, it would be un-
wise to state categorically that Ohio courts will, in all cases, construe
the partial incompetency of a spouse to testify against the other spouse
as a privilege subject to waiver. The trend of judicial anthority, how-
ever, seems to be in that direction.
Persons Who May Claim the Benefits of the Privilege
Ohio law is not clear as to who has the right to claim the privilege
to not testify against one's spouse as conferred by Ohio Revised Code
section 2945.42. In view of the grounds upon which the privilege
rests, it seems clear that the right to invoke the rule should belong to
both the accused and his spouse.9" To hold otherwise would be to put
the accused's spouse in the possible position of either going to jail for
contempt for failure to answer a question posed by the prosecution or
becoming the cause of his spouse's possible conviction.
State's Right to Comment on Invocation of Privilege
Generally, courts will not permit comment on the invocation of the
husband-wife privilege in criminal cases.9" But in Ohio, contrary to the
great weight of authority, the courts hold that the invocation of the
privilege and the failure of the spouse to call his spouse to the stand in
his behalf are the proper subject of comment by the prosecution.99
94. 33 Ohio App. 445, 169 N.E. 833 (1929).
95. Locke v. State, 33 Ohio App. 445, 448, 169 N.E. 833, 835 (1929).
96. Note, supra note 91, at 81.
97. Ibid.
98. Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118 (1893); Zumwalt v. State. 16 Ariz. 82, 141 Pac.
710 (1914); People v. Klor, 32 Cal. 2d 658, 197 P.2d 705 (1948); State v. Spears, 76
Wyo. 82, 300 P.2d 551 (1956). The UNIFORM RuLES OF EVIDENCE § 23 (4) prohibit
any comment by court or counsel. On the other hand, the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE §
201 (3) allows comment by court or counsel if the privilege is claimed and allowed.
99. State v. Herman, 179 N.E.2d 89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
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State v. Herman,°° the principal Ohio case supporting the right of
the state to comment on the accused's invocation of the privilege, relies
upon an analogy between the invocation of the privilege and the failure
of the accused to take the stand in his own defense.' Since the Ohio
Constitution specifically provides that the state may comment on the ac-
cused's failure to take the stand in his own defense,0 2 the court held that
the same principle applied in respect to the invocation of the privilege.
CONCLUSION
The three common-law rules concerning husband-wife testimony
journeyed long through history before being incorporated into the statutory
law of Ohio. Ohio courts would do well to consider these common-law
foundations when construing the husband-wife statutes in future cases.
LEONARD R. STEINSAPIR
100. Ibid.
101. Id. at 90.
102. The analogy seems incomplete. OHIO CONsT. art. 1, 5 10 provides that "No person
shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself; but his failure to
testify may be considered by the court and the jury and may be the subject of comment by
counsel." But OHIO REv. CODE § 2945.42 provides that "Husband and wife shall not
testify .. " This section does not provide for comment upon the invocation of the privilege.
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